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ABSTRACT
The aim of the paper is to bring out exactly what makes first-personal (and more 
generally indexical and demonstrative) contents special, by showing that they 
perform a distinctive cognitive function. Namely, they are stopping points of 
inquiry. First, I articulate this idea and then I use it to clear the ground from a 
troublesome conflation. That is, the conflation of this particular function all 
first-person thoughts have with the property of immunity to error through 
misidentification, which only some I-thoughts enjoy. Afterward, I show the 
implications of this idea for a theory of first-person content and of immunity 
to error though misidentification. I then make some comparisons with Pryor’s 
notion of wh-misidentification and immunity thereof and with Cappelen and 
Dever’s position on immunity to error through misidentification and show why 
they are defective.
ARTICLE HISTORY received 13 February 2016; Accepted 8 June 2016
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Is there anything philosophically deep about indexicality and in particular 
about the first person? Is there anything like an irreducibly first-personal 
content, let it be perceptual or squarely propositional? Several philosophers, 
from Frege to Russell, from Perry to Lewis, from Evans to Shoemaker, up 
to many present-day practitioners of the discipline have answered in the 
affirmative. In The Inessential Indexical (2013), in contrast, Herman Cappelen 
and Josh Dever have recently argued that there are no irreducibly first-per-
sonal contents or at least no good arguments that establish otherwise. In 
their view, the standard cases, usually appealed to in order to support the 
opposite view, are really nothing more than illustrations of the opacity of 
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234   A. COLIVA
propositional content, which displays itself in the failure in intensional con-
texts of the principle of substitutivity salva veritate of co-referential terms.
I beg to disagree. I do think there are irreducibly first-personal contents. 
They are not entirely unique in what makes them special, though. They 
share what makes them distinctive with other indexical contents – par-
ticularly with here and now contents – as well as with genuinely demon-
strative contents. The aim of this paper is to bring out exactly what makes 
them special, by showing that they perform a distinctive cognitive func-
tion. Namely, they are stopping points of inquiry. First, I articulate this idea 
(Section 1) and then I use it to clear the ground from a troublesome con-
flation (Section 2). That is, the conflation of this particular function all 
first-person thoughts have with the property of immunity to error through 
misidentification, which only some I-thoughts enjoy. Afterward (Section 3), 
I show the implications of all that for a theory of first-person content and of 
immunity to error though misidentification. In particular, I claim that error 
and immunity to error through misidentification are epistemic phenomena, 
having simply to do with the structure of the epistemic grounds of the judg-
ment. In particular, I claim that it is necessary and sufficient for an I-judgment 
to be immune to error through misidentification that it is not based on any 
identification component as part of its epistemic grounds and I show why 
this rules out some alternative explanations. I then make some compari-
sons with Pryor’s notion of wh-misidentification and immunity thereof and 
with Cappelen and Dever’s position (Section 4). I claim that Pryor’s notions 
are spurious and that while Cappelen and Dever are right in holding that 
indexicality, in particular I-indexicality, does not suffice for immunity to error 
through misidentification, they are wrong in thinking it is not necessary for 
it. In particular, they have no case for the view that also proper names may 
be used in judgements, which are so immune. Their case for claiming that 
proprioception does not contain indexical contents is scant, and shows, 
at most, that at least demonstrative contents are needed in order to have 
judgements which are immune to error through misidentification. This is no 
news, however, since all parties agree that immunity is not the property only 
of (some) I-contents, but also of (at least some) here, now, or that-contents.
1. Stopping points: ‘I’ and the real guarantee
In my view, indexical and in particular first-personal contents possess what, 
elsewhere (Coliva 2003, 2012), I have called ‘the real guarantee’. The name 
may sound cumbersome and probably is. Nevertheless, here is the sim-
ple idea: once you entertain an I-content like ‘I am F’ (and I will focus on 
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propositional contents for convenience in the rest of this paper, if not explic-
itly indicated otherwise), there is no room for a certain kind of question. 
Namely, assuming the proposition ascribes a certain property to the individ-
ual, it makes no sense to ask ‘Who does (or seems to) have that property?’; 
or, equivalently, ‘Which person does (or seems to) have that property?’. To 
put it otherwise, once you entertain a first-person content, you have reached 
a stopping point of inquiry. If you are entertaining a genuinely first-per-
sonal content, you automatically know that it is you that have (or seem 
to have) the property in question and there is no room left for an inquiry 
concerning who has that property. Hence, to put it emphatically, what dis-
tinguishes first-person contents from impersonal ones is their ‘luminosity’ 
in one respect. Namely, they are luminous regarding the individuation of 
the subject who has (or seems to have) the property which gets ascribed to 
her in the proposition. There is, therefore, no more work that could possibly 
be done to individuate that subject.
If I am right, then, while we can agree with Cappelen and Dever that 
many cases usually presented to support the view that there are irreducibly 
first-personal contents are variations on Frege’s Hesperus-Phosphorus case, 
and therefore may be interpreted as showing the opacity of propositional 
content, the intended reading of all those cases – meaning the one which 
is in fact relevant to the discussion on indexicality – is actually different. In 
particular, if I am right, this should bring into sharper relief the idea that 
those cases actually aim at showing that once you entertain a first-person 
content, you can no longer be ignorant regarding who has the property 
ascribed to her in the relevant proposition. Conversely, until you home in 
an I-content, you may be so ignorant. Hence, while when I entertain the 
proposition ‘AC is F’, I may devise scenarios in which I go on sensibly to ask 
‘Ok, AC is F, but which person is AC?’, once I home in an I-content, then I 
can no longer sensibly ask ‘OK, I am F, but which person is I?’. If I asked that 
question, that would show either that I do not have the first-person concept 
and that, in its turn, will prevent me from entertaining an I-thought at all; or 
else that I do have the concept but are (perhaps only momentarily) insane 
– and therefore irrational – not just ignorant.
I cannot possibly survey all cases presented in the literature on the first 
person, which, to my mind, aim to make this point. However, here is a telling 
handful of them.
Perry-1: I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing 
my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on 
the other, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was making 
a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I 
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236   A. COLIVA
seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I was 
trying to catch … I believed at the outset that the shopper with a torn sack 
was making a mess. And I was right. But I didn’t believe that I was making 
a mess. That seems to be something I came to believe. And when I came to 
believe that, I stopped following the trail around the counter, and rearranged 
the torn sack in my cart (1979, 3).
Perry-2: An amnesiac, Rudolf Lingens, is lost in the Stanford Library. He 
reads a number of things in the library, including a biography of himself, and 
a detailed account of the library in which he is lost … He still won’t know 
who he is, and where he is, no matter how much knowledge he piles up, 
until that moment when he is ready to say, ‘This place is aisle five, floor six, 
of Main Library, Stanford. I am Rudolf Lingens’ (1977, 492).
Lewis: Consider the case of the two gods. They inhabit a certain possible 
world, and they know exactly which world it is. Therefore, they know every 
proposition that is true at their world. Insofar as knowledge is a propositional 
attitude, they are omniscient. Still I can imagine them to suffer ignorance: 
neither one knows which of the two he is. (…) The trouble might perhaps be 
that they have an equally perfect view of every part of their world, and hence 
cannot identify the perspective from which they view it (1979, 520).
To repeat, what these samples collectively show, if we focus 
on the passages in italics, is that homing in a first-person thought 
(or indeed a demonstrative one as well, like in Perry-2) is the stopping point 
of one’s inquiry. For it resolves, once and for all, one’s previous ignorance 
regarding who was supposed to have the properties ascribed by a given 
(list of ) predicative concept(s) in the relevant (list of ) proposition(s). If that 
is right, then no wonder that first-personal, or more generally indexical and 
genuinely demonstrative contents, have been taken to play a fundamental 
role in our cognitive lives. For they actually allow us to locate ourselves spa-
tially, temporally, and with respect to other objects, even when we cannot 
locate ourselves and our spatio-temporal location in objective – that is to 
say, non-perspectival – ways.1 Conversely, the passages reported show that, 
just by itself, the objective individuation of ourselves and our whereabouts 
is not sufficient to secure that we know which person, place and time we 
are thinking about.
To see that this guarantee does not hold with respect to one’s proper 
name, even when one knows it is one’s own name, and so to see that index-
icals are indispensable, it is enough to recall Perry’s own words:
1E.g. As AC, writing this sentence at 10.05 am Italian time november 23 2015, in her study room in her 
apartment in Bologna, at such-and-such an address.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
he
 U
C 
Irv
ine
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
7:5
3 1
1 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
INQUIRY  237
Perry-3: Suppose I had said, in the manner of de Gaulle, ‘I came to believe 
that John Perry is making a mess’: I would no longer have explained why 
I stopped and looked in my own cart. To explain that I would have to add, 
‘and I believe that I am John Perry’, bringing in the indexical again (1979, 4).
To unpack the reasoning a bit, consider that to know one’s name just 
amounts to knowing ‘I am called NN’ (or else, ‘I am (identical to the person 
named) NN’). Now, it is only on the background of such knowledge that the 
sentence à la de Gaulle, which does not overtly contain the first person in 
the embedded content, can explain why Perry stopped searching for the 
messy shopper once he realized that John Perry was making a mess. Take 
that assumption away – namely, take away the assumption ‘I am called John 
Perry’ (or ‘I am (identical to the person named) NN’) – , and so interpret the 
phrase as having simply to do with the person named ‘John Perry’, clearly the 
inquiry would not be over. For the shopper would have to look for that guy.
Of course, the reply might be that a similar case can be construed with 
two different proper names for the same person, like ‘Superman’ and ‘Clarke 
Kent’. Hence, consider:
Cappelen-Dever 1: Pushing my cart down the aisle I was looking for CK to 
tell him he was making a mess. I kept passing by Superman, but couldn’t 
find CK. Finally, I realized, Superman was CK. I believed at the outset that CK 
was making a mess. And I was right. But I didn’t believe that Superman was 
making a mess. That seems to be something I came to believe. And when I 
came to believe that, I stopped looking around and I told Superman to clean 
up after himself (2013, 33).
Still, a moment reflection suffices to show that the stopping point of our 
subject’s search in not really given by her realization that Superman is Clark 
Kent, but rather, by her realization that that person she kept passing by, pre-
sented to her as Superman, was Clark Kent. Had she not realized that, she 
would have still gone around looking for Superman/Clark Kent, even once 
in possession of the revealing piece of news that Superman is Clark Kent.
To sum up: the real guarantee is distinctive of I-contents and is not pos-
sessed by other concepts, which pick out the same referent. Only I-contents 
(and more generally indexical and demonstrative ones) can perform the 
function of stopping points of inquiry. It is this function, I have claimed, 
theorists who have defended the indispensability of indexicals have been 
trying to pinpoint with their various examples. They have not simply brought 
up more Fregean Hesperous-Phosphorous cases, which – it should be agreed 
by all parties – simply show the opacity of propositional contents. Hence, 
there is an interesting and distinctive phenomenon to be explained, contrary 
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238   A. COLIVA
to what supporters of the dispensability of indexicality and of the de se, in 
particular, have been arguing for recently.
2. The real guarantee vs. immunity to error through 
misidentification
The real guarantee, enjoyed by first-person contents, or indeed, mutatis 
mutandis, by indexical and genuinely demonstrative ones, has often been 
conflated with immunity to error through misidentification. Elsewhere 
(Coliva 2003), I have tried to disentangle these two issues. Here, I will not 
go into the details, but I will summarize the gist of that discussion to show 
how the real guarantee and immunity to error through misidentification are 
different phenomena, which should be carefully kept apart.
Consider a standard case of error through misidentification, involving 
the first-person. You look at a glass window and form the thought ‘My hair 
is blowing in the wind’. Unbeknownst to you, it is someone else’s hair that 
gets blown by the wind. Whether or not your hair is blowing in the wind, it 
is not your hair you saw reflected in the glass window. So you are mistaken 
about whose hair is blowing in the wind. You have mistaken someone else’s 
hair for yours. You are wrong about the following identity:
(1)   I = the person whose hair I am now seeing reflected in the glass 
window
Notice, however, that even when you mistakenly think that it is your hair 
that is blowing in the wind, and you are entertaining such a thought because 
of a mistaken identification like (1), and are therefore guilty of error through 
misidentification relative to the first person, there is something that, just 
in virtue of being entertaining that thought, you cannot be mistaken, or 
even be ignorant about. Namely which person you are thinking about when 
you entertain that ill-grounded and possibly false thought – that is to say, 
yourself.
Thus, you can be wrong about ‘My hair is blowing in the wind’ and be 
wrong about it because you wrongly believe (1). But in exactly the same 
scenario, if possessed of the first-personal concept and rational, you cannot 
wonder: ‘My hair is blowing in the wind, but which is the person whose hair 
is blowing in the wind?’. To repeat, you may be wrong in thinking that the 
person whose hair is blowing in the wind is you, but once you have that 
belief you cannot be ignorant with respect to which person you (mistakenly 
as it happens) think has her hair blown by the wind. To put it otherwise, if you 
believe ‘My hair is blowing in the wind’, no matter how mistaken you are, and 
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even if you are guilty of an error of misidentification, there is no possibility 
for you to go on sensibly to inquire which person has her hair blown by the 
wind. Of course, later on, you could be appraised of your mistake, but at 
that stage, you would revise by judging ‘Well then, someone else had her 
hair blown by the wind. Let us find out who that person was’ and not ‘Well 
then, I didn’t know whom I was thinking about when I thought my hair was 
blowing in the wind. Let us find out who that person is’.
Compare with a different scenario, one in which you believe, because 
you hear a conversation among by-passers, that Elena Cocò’s hair is blowing 
in the wind. Suppose, moreover, that it is the case that Elena Cocò’s hair is 
blowing in the wind and that the people who said so had correctly identified 
her and had therefore formed their judgment on a correct epistemological 
basis. (This is something that any theory of propositional content and of 
testimonial knowledge/justification should allow for. So we can stay clear of 
all details for present purposes.) Hence, you correctly believe ‘Elena Cocò’s 
hair is blowing in the wind’. Your judgment, though not immune to error 
through misidentification, is actually not affected by such a mistake. Now 
you can sensibly wonder ‘Ok, Elena Coco’s hair is blowing in the wind, but 
which is this person (i.e. the one whose hair is blowing in the wind)?’. Indeed, 
you may set out to find out who, in the surroundings of those people whose 
conversation you heard, has her hair blown by the wind and to figure out, 
if there is more than one person (but this is strictly irrelevant), which one is 
Elena Cocò. When that particular person whose hair is blowing in the wind 
tells you ‘I am Elena Cocò’ (or else, someone else points out to you that 
that particular person is Elena Cocò), you have reached your stopping point 
and cannot sensibly pursue your inquiry any longer (provided no lies were 
told about her name). In that case, your inquiry is stopped by your having 
reached a demonstrative content ‘That person is Elena Cocò’, which allows 
you to individuate the relevant person.
To sum up: the real guarantee, which is enjoyed only by the first-person 
concept (and other indexical or demonstrative concepts), allows the lat-
ter to play the role of stopping point of inquiry even when the judgment 
made using it is affected by error through misidentification. The real guar-
antee and immunity to error through misidentification are therefore two 
different phenomena; for the former can occur without the latter. Indeed, 
the former occurs any time there is an I-content, while the latter does not. 
Hence, the deep phenomenon to be accounted for is the real guarantee, 
for it is the distinctive characteristic of I-contents (as well as of other index-
ical and demonstrative contents). In contrast, as we saw with Elena Cocò’s 
case, you may well make a judgment, which is not affected by error through 
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240   A. COLIVA
misidentification and still have not reached a stopping point of inquiry. Once 
again, that contributes toward showing how indexicality is characterized 
by the real guarantee, not by the contingent absence of an error through 
misidentification.
3. Two morals
I think we can draw two morals from these cases. First, that whatever account 
you wish to give of error and immunity to error through misidentification, it 
had better be such that it does not end up entailing that when there is error 
through misidentification relative to the first person, you have somehow 
lost the capacity of actually thinking about yourself and would no longer be 
able to know which person you are thinking about. For all comprehending 
uses of the first person, even those made in the course of a judgment about 
oneself that is afflicted by error though misidentification, are such that you 
are indeed thinking about yourself and therefore know exactly which person 
you are thinking about. This, in my view, has important consequences. For 
it rules out two early attempts at explaining – allegedly – immunity to error 
through misidentification, namely Andrea Christofidou’s (1995) and Carol 
Rovane’s (1987, 1993). It also shows why Elizabeth Anscombe, in her cele-
brated paper ‘The First Person’ (1975), was not really addressing immunity 
to error through misidentification, but grappling with the real guarantee. 
(For the details, see Coliva 2003).
More generally, however, it also shows why immunity to error through 
misidentification cannot be explained just by adverting to this or that fea-
ture of our first-person concept. For that very concept, with all its distinctive 
features, is used also in first-personal judgements affected by error through 
misidentification. Hence, immunity to error through misidentification, if it 
exists at all, and I believe it does (contrary to Cappelen and Dever), cannot 
be accounted for simply in semantic terms.
In Coliva (2006, 2012), I have tried to hammer into this point and, in par-
ticular, to make a case that error and immunity to error through misiden-
tification are to be understood as epistemic phenomena. That is to say, as 
having to do with the kind of epistemic grounds on which the relevant 
first-person judgements are based. People may, and indeed do disagree with 
the details of my positive epistemic explanation, but I hope the foregoing 
will convince them of the soundness of the general direction I have taken.
Of course, this leaves open another possibility. Namely, that once we try 
better to understand the sources of the real guarantee, and therefore dwell 
deeper into the status and provenance of the first-person concept, it may turn 
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out that possessing that concept depends on being able to think about one-
self by exploiting a kind of evidence which is also the one which gives rise to 
first-personal judgments that are immune to error through misidentification. 
Indeed, to that kind of I-judgements, which, following Shoemaker (1968), I 
have claimed (Coliva 2006, 2012) are logically, and not merely de facto, immune 
to error through misidentification. For we need to secure that the first-person 
concept homes-in the right referent, no matter how deviant a subject’s overall 
set up might be; otherwise, we would have simply failed to individuate the 
first-person concept at all.
If that is the case, then we would witness the following intriguing struc-
ture. The possession of the first-person concept is grounded in evidence, 
which allows one to single out the right referent in all possible circum-
stances. Hence, it is grounded in evidence which, when exploited to produce 
first-personal judgements leads to I-contents, which are logically immune to 
error through misidentification. Yet, the first-person concept can be used to 
produce I-judgments, which may not be logically immune to error through 
misidentification (either because they are affected by error through misi-
dentification, or are simply de facto so immune).2 What that would show, in 
its turn, is that there are non-conceptual yet first-personal representations, 
which ground our possession of the first-person concept. Hence, indexicality 
would run quite deep. It would not just make its appearance in thought, let 
alone in language. Rather, it would already be present in those representa-
tions – either in their very content or in their anchoring point – that make 
it possible for us to acquire indexical concepts in the first place. I will not 
pursue the details of this account here. I have partly done so in previous 
work, and I intend to pursue this complex task in the future.3 Nevertheless, 
this seems to me the most promising way of developing Frege’s celebrated 
yet cryptic remark:
Frege-1: Now everyone is presented to himself in a particular and primitive 
way, in which he is presented to no-one else. So, when Dr. Lauben thinks 
that he has been wounded, he will probably take as a basis this primitive 
way in which he is presented to himself. And only Dr Lauben himself can 
grasp thoughts determined in this way (1956, 298).
The second moral is that if all this is right, we should be careful in our use 
of philosophical terminology. In particular, it would be important to intro-
duce two different terms and their cognates and to try to stick to them in the 
interest of clarity and perspicuity. Namely, ‘to individuate’ and ‘to identify’. 
2There will be more about these in the following.
3See Coliva and Sacchi (2001). For a possible development that I find congenial, I defer the reader to Peacocke 
(2014).
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The individuation of an object, a person, or indeed a place and a time is 
achieved by indexicals and genuinely demonstrative concepts. They single 
out particular objects in one’s surroundings, or individuals, or specific places 
and times. They populate our cognitive lives with contextually bounded 
occurrences of this, that, self, you, here, now4 (etc.) and, of the particulars so 
individuated, we may go on to think about as having this or that property. 
Furthermore, as we saw in the case of ‘John Perry’ and ‘Elena Cocò’, they serve 
as anchoring stopping points of other devices we may use to think about 
particulars, like proper names. We can put the point by saying that in virtue 
of their being stopping points, indexicals and demonstratives allow us to 
think about particulars directly, by satisfying what is known in the literature 
on the topic as Russell Principle.5
Russell Principle: In order to think of an object one must know which 
object one’s thought is about.
Now, quite clearly, if we think of demonstratives, the presence in our 
minds of an instance of such a kind of concept is underwritten by abilities 
that are more basic. In the case of perceptual demonstratives, for instance, 
it seems difficult to deny that the relevant concept depends on being able 
perceptually to discriminate the relevant particular in the perceptual scene. 
Mutatis mutandis, something similar ought to be the case when indexicals 
are concerned. Still, being concepts and not more basic representations, 
demonstrative and indexical concepts can be used or deployed in other 
contexts, once a subject is capable of making the appropriate adjustments. 
Frege, I believe, was alluding to that idea in his famous, yet puzzling remark:
Frege-2: If someone wants to say the same today as he expressed yes-
terday using the word ‘today’, he must replace this word with ‘yesterday’. 
Although the thought is the same, its verbal expression must be different 
so that the sense, which would otherwise be affected by the differing times 
of utterance, is re-adjusted. The case is the same with words like ‘here’ and 
‘there’ (1956, 296).
Evans’ The Varieties of Reference (1982) and the literature that stemmed 
from it can be seen as developing that point and as offering, primarily, a 
theory of particulars’ individuation and of the dynamics of indexical and 
demonstrative thought.
An identification, in contrast, goes beyond the mere individuation of a 
particular, and establishes an identity between the object presented – that is 
4I use small caps for concepts.
5See Coliva and Sacchi (2001, chapter 1) for a detailed treatment of russell Principle and its history. It is not 
my aim to provide an account of concepts canonically expressed by proper names. From a cognitive point of 
view, they do not work as stopping points unless we are able to anchor them by means of demonstratives 
or indexicals such as that (person), or he/she/you, etc.
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individuated – thus1 and the object presented – that is, individuated – thus2. 
When things go right, it is the same object thought about in two different 
ways and therefore the identity is true and informative, even if necessary. 
That is the case with
(i)  Hesperus = Phosphorus
(ii)  Mary Ann Evans = George Eliot
When things go wrong, the objects are different; the identity is false and 
potentially misleading. Error through misidentification, properly understood, 
can only occur when such an identity judgment goes wrong. Immunity to 
error through misidentification, in contrast, depends either
(A)  on the absence of any identification component and is actually 
due to the fact that the judgment in question depends on the exer-
cise of a merely individuative (that is to say, discriminative ability), 
which allows us to single out one specific particular among many; 
or else,
(B)  on the fact that the identity is a priori and necessarily true.
I think the former is the case when (logically) immune to error through misiden-
tification I-judgements are at stake. I also think there are cases of the second 
kind, however. They do not arise in the domain of contingent truths, though. 
Still, the identification between ‘3’ and ‘√9’ fulfills the requirements of immunity 
to error through misidentification as thought of as depending on the a priori 
truth of a necessary identity. However, ‘I = the thinker of this thought (or of 
this token of I)’, which is an “identity” some theorists might want to appeal to 
in order to account for logical immunity to error through misidentification 
of at least some I-judgements, is not like ‘3 = √9’. In particular, the latter is 
informative, while the former is not. While the former correctly individuates the 
first- person concept, it does not really establish an identity between an object 
thought of thus1 and thus2. The arithmetical analog of ‘I = the thinker of this 
thought (or of this token of I)’, therefore, is not ‘3 = √9’, but ‘3 is the successor of 
2’. While the latter is such that anyone who possesses the concept 3 (whether 
it is itself ultimately analytic or synthetic a priori is something we should not 
care about in this context) cannot fail to assent to it, it is not enough merely 
to have the concept 3 in order to see that ‘3 = √9’. (Of course, also ‘3 = √9’ may 
turn out to be analytic, for instance if you endorse neo-logicism. Still, it would 
not figure among the axioms, let alone the definitions of the theory, but only 
among its theorems. Hence, also for someone who is persuaded that all arith-
metical truths are analytic, there is clearly a difference between definitions and 
axiomatic truths, and those truths that deductively follow from the axioms 
and/or the definitions of the theory). All this suggests that ‘3’ works like an 
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indexical, at least for us who are accustomed to a decimal system, for it consti-
tutes the stopping point of our inquiry when, for instance, we need to find out 
the number which satisfies the function ‘being the positive square root of 9’.6
What this shows, once more, is that immunity to error through misiden-
tification, if it exists, cannot be accounted for by appealing to the semantic 
or functional role of the first-person concept, or to its (Kaplanian) role or its 
equivalent in thought. The problem is not one of detail. It is not whether it 
is correct to think of that role as ‘the thinker of this thought’ or ‘the thinker 
of this token of I’, or whatever have you. The problem is much more basic 
and fundamental. Whatever (implicitly) defines a concept – in this case the 
first-person concept – cannot play double duty and provide us with an inde-
pendent identification – on the right hand-side – of the object presented 
on the left hand-side. It is not by chance, therefore, that in mathematics we 
do not use the same symbol for definition and for identity. Similarly, in phi-
losophy of language and mind we should be mindful of the fact that those 
definiens are, indeed, such and not different ways of presenting an already 
individuated object – that is, oneself. To be clear to the point of running the 
risk of sounding trivial, but in the context of the reflection on immunity to 
error through misidentification repeating the obvious may be important, 
we should keep in mind that
(2)   I = df the thinker of this thought (or the thinker of this token of I)
is altogether different from
(3)   I = AC
While (2) individuates a concept and tells us, philosophers, where we 
should start looking for the distinctive pre-conceptual abilities which even-
tually allow us to think about ourselves in a first-personal way, (3) states an 
identity, based on an identification, between, if I am not mistaken about my 
name and my biography, myself thought of as myself and myself thought 
of as the bearer of that name (if not also through some further descriptive 
information).
But now, if (2) is not in any decently precise sense an identification and is, 
once appropriately understood, a definition of the first-person concept, or 
at the very least a characterization of its conceptual role, it is obvious that it 
cannot be appealed to in order to explain those cases in which an I-judgment 
occurs and yet it is (logically) immune to error through misidentification, 
6Obviously, I cannot take up the task of defending this idea here; nor can I develop any further the comparison 
between immunity to error through misidentification in the domain of arithmetic and in the domain of 
demonstrative and indexical judgements. I believe, however, this would be an exciting area of research.
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by saying that in those case the relevant identification is between oneself 
and the thinker of this thought (or the thinker of this token of I). For there is 
simply is no such identification. Nor there can possibly be. Eminent theorists, 
therefore, have conflated identification and definition and have thought of 
appealing to the latter to explain the former, and in particular immunity to 
error through misidentification.7 This, as we have seen, cannot be right. The 
right account of (logical) immunity to error through misidentification in the 
empirical domain, therefore, is one that builds on the idea that the relevant 
self-ascriptions are so immune because they are not based on any identifi-
cation component at all. The conceptual role of the first-person concept, in 
contrast, if correctly specified, should account for the fact that that concept 
enjoys the real guarantee. To repeat, it is such that, just by employing it, one 
cannot fail to know which person one is referring to by means of it.
Moreover, in order to distinguish logical from merely de facto immunity to 
error through misidentification, the explanation had better be fine-grained 
enough to allow for levels at which the relevant identifications may neverthe-
less be present. After all, we all have the intuition that even if, de facto, ‘My legs 
are bent’ when based on proprioceptive feelings is immune to error through 
misidentification, this is only a contingent truth due to the fact that in this 
world we receive proprioceptive information just from our bodies. Still, that 
does not rule out the possibility that in a (metaphysically and epistemically) 
different possible world things may be otherwise. We therefore need a theory 
that makes room for that possibility, while acknowledging that this is not what 
actually happens in this world (luckily). In Coliva (2006, 2012) I have provided 
the details. Here I am filling out the more general picture which motivates 
that strategy and does so in a very general way. Hence, also those who are 
unconvinced about the details of my previous proposals should eventually 
see why something along those lines had better be right.
To repeat a point already made but which is worth insisting upon: it is 
one thing to allow for cases in which ‘My legs are bent’, even when based 
on proprioceptive information, may involve a mistaken identification of the 
person whose legs are so bent. This will presumably be due to the presence, 
in the grounds (generally speaking8) of a mistaken identification component 
of the form
7This mistake can be found in earlier work by Peacocke (2008) and it seems to me to motivate Higginbotham’s 
(2010) strategy.
8In Coliva (2006, 2012) I have argued that we should distinguish between grounds and background presup-
positions of a judgment like that. Then, depending on one’s overall theoretical preferences, the relevant 
identification component can figure in the latter and make the judgment affected by error through misi-
dentification relative to its background presuppositions; or else, once given a subject enough information 
about her current state, that identification would be moved to the grounds she could offer if she were 
asked to make sense of her (mistaken, as it happens) belief ‘My legs are bent’.
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(4)   I = the person whose legs are responsible for the proprioceptive 
information/feelings I am now having
It is an altogether different thing to hold that, given that mistaken identi-
fication, the person who thinks ‘My legs are bent’ is actually thinking about 
someone else. The point I have been making about the distinction between 
the real guarantee and immunity to error through misidentification should 
make us aware of the fact that this is not really a possibility. Even when there 
is such a mistaken identification component as part of one’s grounds (gen-
erally speaking) for one’s judgment, one is indeed thinking of oneself and 
ascribing to oneself a property one does not have. (Actually, one’s judgment 
might be true; yet, if it were, it would be ill grounded for it would be based 
on someone else’s legs being bent).
4. Some comparisons
Let me briefly compare this account with some claims advanced in the lit-
erature on immunity to error through misidentification and the first person.
First of all, let us very briefly compare my distinction between immu-
nity to error through misidentification and the real guarantee with Pryor’s 
(1999) suggestion that the interesting kind of immunity is what he dubs 
‘wh-immunity’. I have already said why, in my view (Coliva 2006), wh-error 
through misidentification is not a case of error through misidentification 
at all. The idea is that either it is simply a case of erroneous predication, or 
else it is a case of the familiar kind of error through misidentification, which 
involves a mistaken identification component, one containing a rigid defi-
nite description as one of the two concepts flagging on opposite sides of the 
identity. To see why, let us go back to Pryor’s example concerning a smelly 
skunk. Either, after smelling a skunky smell, the subject wrongly ascribes to 
a visually presented animal the property of being a skunk, when in fact it 
isn’t one; or else, she wrongly believes that that animal is a skunk because 
of a mistaken identification component as part of her (perhaps implicit) 
grounds for her judgment. Namely,
(5)   That animal = the animal which is (actually) responsible for the 
skunky odor I am smelling
Nevertheless, here I should briefly like to say why immunity to wh-mis-
identification is no immunity to error through misidentification. The main 
reason is that since, in my view, wh-error through misidentification differs 
from error through misidentification only if it is actually taken to be a case of 
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mistaken predication, the corresponding kind of immunity should amount 
to the impossibility of making a predication mistake. Clearly, however, this 
is not what immunity to error through misidentification (logical or de facto) 
amounts to. That is to say, even when I self-ascribe an occurrent mental 
state to myself, based on introspective awareness, I may make a mistake of 
predication, even though, in my view, I cannot take someone else’s mental 
state to be mine. For, if I am aware of that mental state on that basis – that is, 
introspection9 – it is mine, even if it can (metaphysically) originate in some-
one else’s brain activity. For instance, if I have a terrible toothache, it hurts 
me; I try to get rid of it one way or the other, etc. Never mind if it originates 
in someone else’s brain activity. That is to say, I may not be its author, or its 
causal origin, but it is still mine. Indeed, it affects me, it moves me to act 
in certain ways, and there is something it is like to have it, just like when it 
originates in the normal way from my brain.10 However, even in the normal 
run of cases, I may go wrong in identifying the kind of mental state I am 
having. After all, it may be a gums’ ache, rather than a toothache.
Still, maybe what Pryor is really interested in, and calls wh-immunity to 
error through misidentification, is in fact what I call ‘the real guarantee’. If 
so, however, there is no possibility of failure and hence of wh-error through 
misidentification, even when one takes someone else’s hair to be blowing 
in the wind, or even when one takes someone else’s legs to be bent on the 
basis of one’s proprioceptive feelings. That is to say, even in those cases I 
would know whom I thinking about as having her hair blown by the wind, 
or as having bent legs. Hence, wh-error and wh-immunity to error through 
misidentification cannot be used, as Pryor does, to reconcile Evans and 
Shoemaker by saying that even if self-ascriptions based on proprioception 
do not involve identification components, and are therefore such as to lead 
to immunity to error through misidentification of the usual (non-wh) kind, 
they can they still be affected by wh-error through misidentification. For, 
9Here we can remain neutral on what introspection comes down to. Surely, the etymology of the word does 
us a disservice, though, for it suggests that there is something to be seen within ourselves. This kind of 
Cartesian conception of introspection has, however, largely fallen into disrepute nowadays. Virtually all 
theorists agree that, to the extent that there is an inner epistemology, it is not based on having one’s mental 
state in view. They differ on the positive account of introspection they offer, though. I have extensively 
dealt with this topic in Coliva (2016).
10Still, I agree that proprioception does not suffice for making the other person’s legs mine. It seems to me 
that the criteria of bodily identity and mental identity vary considerably. Hence, I can perfectly well have 
proprioceptive feelings, which are entirely mine, but do not suffice to make their causal origin – that 
person’s legs – mine. In contrast, even if my introspectively available mental states originated in someone 
else’s brain activity, they would be mine, despite the fact I would not be at their causal origin. If we call 
the person who is at the causal origin of a mental state ‘the author’ of that mental state and the person 
who is introspectively aware of it ‘the owner’, it may be that a given token mental state is authored by one 
person and owned by two different people.
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if wh-immunity to error through misidentification is identical to the real 
guarantee, then all I-judgements enjoy it.
Recently, Cappelen and Dever (2013, pp. 133–135) have claimed that 
indexicality is neither necessary nor sufficient for immunity to error through 
misidentification. Now, given all I have been saying about the difference 
between the real guarantee and immunity to error through misidentification, 
I agree that indexicality is not sufficient for immunity to error through misi-
dentification. We have seen plenty of cases in which there is an I-judgment, 
hence an idexical one, possessed of the real guarantee, and yet such as to 
be used in judgment on the grounds of a mistaken identification compo-
nent. What more is needed in order to have immunity is precisely that the 
epistemic structure sustaining the judgment be free of any identification 
component.11
Yet, it seems to me that indexicality is necessary for immunity to error 
through misidentification. Two are the main considerations marshaled 
against that view by Cappelen and Dever. First, John Campbell’s ‘John the 
Ripper case’.
Cappelen-Dever 2: If Holmes believes that Jack the Ripper is the killer, he 
may be wrong, for there may be no killer. But he cannot be wrong because 
he is thinking about the wrong person: he is thinking about the killer, if there 
is one, or about no one, if there is not. Descriptive names are not indexical, 
so here we have immunity without indexicality. (p. 134)
Yet, descriptive names are either devices for general reference (so Holmes 
is thinking of whoever satisfies the property of being the killer of the relevant 
victims), in which case the issue of their being immune to error through 
misidentification does not even arise, for that minimally requires a singu-
lar thought. Or else, they are devices for singular reference. That, however, 
involves a demonstrative, de re thought about that person, who – rightly 
or wrongly – is taken to have committed those murders, even if one is not 
yet able perceptually to single it out among many. In the latter case, then, 
immunity to error through misidentification would occur, but it would be 
11They object to the sufficiency of identification-freedom for immunity to error through misidentification 
by arguing that there may be inductively justified I-judgments, free of any identification component and 
yet liable or indeed affected by error through misidentification (cf. Cappelen and Dever 2013, 136). now, 
to the extent to which I understand this under-explained possibility, it seems to me that for induction to 
justify a generalization about oneself, it must trade on the identity of the subject who, at different times, 
has instantiated a given property. Thus, there is the assumption, in the background presuppositions of one’s 
judgment, that the person one takes to have instantiated those properties in the past is indeed oneself 
and not someone else. If that background presupposition is false – that is, if one takes oneself to have 
instantiated F at t
1
, when in fact, at t
1
, someone else instantiated it and one wrongly took that person to 
be identical to oneself – then the inductive generalization may be false, or at least ill grounded, and that 
would be due to a mistaken identification component in its background presuppositions.
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due to the occurrence of a demonstrative thought (albeit not of a perceptual 
kind).12 Hence, the case of ‘John the Ripper’ would not show that devices for 
singular reference other than indexicals and demonstratives can be used in 
judgements which are immune to error through misidentification.
The second consideration Cappelen and Dever put forward hinges on 
the idea that immunity to error through misidentification can occur with 
‘identity-neutral’ contents. Maybe proprioception just gives one certain 
identity-neutral experiences, which however invariably correlate with one’s 
being in the relevant state. In response, it should be noted that the ‘identi-
ty-committed’ character of proprioceptive contents is the one feature virtu-
ally all theorists who have been discussing these issues have largely agreed 
on. Indeed, it seems to be the hallmark of proprioceptive (vs. allo-ceptive) 
feelings (or information). Hence, if we take that away we would not have 
proprio-ception. We would merely have perception of what happens to be 
one’s body but is not felt as one’s own, even if it is perceived through the 
operation of some inner-sense mechanism, rather than by means of sight, 
hearing, touch or smell that are the senses through which we usually per-
ceive other people’s bodies.
This point could be sidestepped by saying that it would be little more than 
terminological. I think this is easier said than done, for, if proprioception were 
identity-neutral, then subjects could sensibly wonder whose legs they are 
feeling ‘from the inside’, whereas they usually do not sensibly wonder that. 
Moreover, even if it is conceivable they could wonder about that, they would 
be under the impression of feeling their legs. In fact, as I have maintained 
in Coliva (2006, 2012), in that case the identification component (4) would 
not license the passage from an identity-neutral to an identity-committed 
content, but from the ascription of the property of seeming or feeling one’s 
legs as bent to the ascription of the property that one’s legs are bent. Still, for 
the sake of argument, let us allow for the possibility that proprioception is in 
fact identity-neutral and let us consider the following example by Cappelen 
and Dever (2013, 135):
Cappelen-Dever 3: Call Gareth’s two legs ‘LL’ and ‘RL’. (One) way of charac-
terizing the situation is by saying that Gareth knows that LL is on top of RL, 
and cannot be wrong about which two legs he is thinking about.
The idea they wish to put forward by means of that example is that it 
is a ‘theoretical choice to describe proprioception as delivering self beliefs, 
rather than LL, RL, etc. beliefs’ (2013, 135). As I have tried to show, it is not 
12The fact that one would not be able to single him out perceptually may cast doubt on the fact that descrip-
tive proper names actually work as devices for singular reference. That would just leave us with the first 
option discussed in the main text, which poses no problem for the necessity claim.
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so much a theoretical choice as almost an analytic claim, held by a lot of 
theorists who have been working on proprioception, memory, and, more 
generally, on those sources of information (or of information retention) that 
work from the inside of a subject. Let us grant, however, the theoreticity of 
the choice for the sake of argument. Would that show that immunity can be 
had without indexical or demonstrative contents? Obviously not. For surely 
proprioceptive contents do not come with names of one’s bodily parts. So, 
the kind of proprioceptive contents Gareth has are that leg1(for LL) e that 
leg2 (for RL).
13 And now, since it is in the nature of the case Cappelen and 
Dever are conceiving that proprioception, though not containing I-contents, 
necessarily gives one correct information about one’s body (otherwise 
they would not even seem to have a case against the fact that immunity 
involves indexicality), all we are left with is the idea that in such a case there 
is a singular, individuative judgment, concerning that leg1 and containing 
a complex predicative component in which it figures a demonstrative 
concept – that is, being on top of that leg2.
14 The conclusion, therefore, is the 
following conditional one. If one is prepared to allow that proprioception 
may not deliver first-person contents, immunity to error through misiden-
tification is nevertheless tight to demonstrative contents. In particular, it 
arises whenever there is no identification but merely an individuation of a 
particular (let it be a physical object, a place or a moment in time), through 
a demonstrative content, which then gives rise to a judgment containing a 
demonstrative concept.
Thus, indexicals and demonstratives are necessary for immunity to error 
through misidentification, even though they are not sufficient for it, as there 
can be indexical or demonstrative judgements which are not the result sim-
ply of an individuation but of a (possibly mistaken) identification, occurring 
in the grounds (generally speaking) of the judgment itself.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have seen that what makes indexical and demonstrative 
contents special is a distinctive cognitive function they alone perform. 
Namely, the function of being stopping points of inquiry. We have focused 
on I-contents and have claimed that such a function depends on the fact that 
they enjoy what elsewhere I have dubbed ‘the real guarantee’. Namely, the 
13I use the underscored notation to indicate proprioceptive contents.
14That seems to me the most charitable reading of their example. For if the judgment were based on iden-
tifying that leg
1
 with LL and that leg
2
 with rL, there would be room for error through misidentification.
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guarantee of knowing, just by having I-thoughts, which person one is think-
ing about. We have then seen that that guarantee, which is enjoyed by all 
I-judgements, should not be conflated with immunity to error through mis-
identification, which only some I-judgements partake. Error and immunity 
to error through misidentification are epistemic phenomena, that depend 
on the grounds on which a given I-judgment is based, and, in particular on 
whether they contain or lack any identification component. After compar-
ing the real guarantee with Pryor’s notion of wh-immunity to error through 
misidentification, we have seen that while Cappelen and Dever are right 
in holding that indexicality, in particular I-indexicality, does not suffice for 
immunity to error through misidentification, it is necessary for it, contrary to 
what they maintain. Or, at the very least, in order to have immunity we need 
contents which, like indexical ones, can play the role of stopping points of 
inquiry and those contents, besides first-personal (and other indexical ones), 
are only demonstrative contents. When used in merely individuative judge-
ments, then, all indexical and demonstrative concepts guarantee immunity 
to error through misidentification, precisely because the relevant judge-
ments do not depend on any identification component. It remains to be fully 
investigated what makes the possession of those concepts possible in the 
first place. The intriguing suggestion, to be left for future development, is 
that they depend on more primitive representational contents, which single 
out their referents in such a way that one cannot fail to know which person, 
object, place or time one is thinking about. In other words, what remains 
to be investigated is how these more primitive representations can secure 
the real guarantee possessed by those concepts. It is the brief of this paper 
that such a guarantee is what distinguishes indexical and demonstrative 
concepts from all other kinds of singular concepts and that it is a much 
deeper phenomenon than immunity to error through misidentification, 
which deserves to be scrutinized by any serious work on these concepts, 
and in particular on the first person.
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